Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Germany and Russia Shifting Balance of Power

From http://el-paso.ucg.org/  or call 1-888-886-8632.


Germany and Russia Shifting Balance of Power

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More than a century after his death, Otto von Bismarck's dream for Germany seems closer to being realized.

Otto von Bismarck, Germany's Iron Chancellor who presided over the unification of Germany and guided the new nation to great power status, was noted for his sometimes conflicting secret alliances that tried to secure Germany's future. Having secretly entered into a pact with the Austrian Empire in 1879, extended to include Italy seven years later, Bismarck then entered into a secret agreement with Russia, even though Russia and Austria were rivals in the Balkans.
Bismarck's great fear was of a Germany compelled to fight on two flanks, east and west. This is exactly what happened in both world wars with the result that Germany lost.
These two defeats contributed to a century of political upheaval in Germany.
In the 20th century there were six distinct Germanys, each in its own way different from the others. The Second Reich of Kaiser Wilhelm II (1888-1918), defeated in war, gave place to the Weimar Republic (1918-33). This was followed by Hitler's Third Reich (1933-45). Again defeated in war, the country came under Allied control for a brief period before the Federal Republic of (West) Germany was established in 1949, soon followed by the creation of the communist (East) German Democratic Republic. In 1990 these two were united, thereby establishing the sixth distinct German nation of the 20th century.
All six Germanys and previous ones were subject to what columnist Josef Joffe calls "the curse of geography." Geographical location has a profound effect upon national attitudes. The predominantly Anglo-Saxon countries are all protected by lengthy coastlines so that they do not have to greatly concern themselves with hostile neighbors. The result is a certain complacency, even naïveté, in their citizens, who often fail to understand the complexities of the outside world. Germany is in an entirely different situation, almost completely surrounded by other nations, all of which it has been in conflict with at one time or another.
The curse of geography
The curse of geography has been a major contributing factor to Germany's history.
Having learned many lessons from history, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer (1949-63), tried a different approach to diplomacy. Gradually a vision emerged of a new united Europe. Its nucleus was to be France and Germany, two nations that had been at war with each other three times in 75 years. These two nations were to be so closely bound to each other economically that they could never go to war again. The nations of Western Europe were able to rebuild while under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella during the Cold War. Closer economic ties between the various nations of the region would make it seemingly impossible for conflict to rear its ugly head again.
Having secured its western flank, in 1969 Germany started reaching out to the East. Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) was aimed at building closer ties to the communist countries of the East, with particular emphasis on East Germany and its master in Moscow. It was to be a further 20 years before the collapse of the communist East and the reunification of Germany. United Germany has recently moved its capital from Bonn back to Berlin, the former Imperial capital, now more appropriate for the nation that has become the dominant power in Europe.
There was a price for unification. Not only was there the economic cost of absorbing millions of poorer East Germans into the new Germany, there was also a cost that had to be paid for French support for reunification. Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised French President Francois Mitterand German support for a new European currency that would bind the two nations even closer together, thereby lessening French fears of reunification.
"…Like Bismarck, Kohl understood the precarious position of Germany-about to become the dominant power in Europe again…. Like Adenauer and Brandt, Kohl knew that Germany was too weak to stand alone but too strong to be left alone….
"Germany's Cold War chains were about to drop off, and so Kohl sought to reassure France and the rest of Europe by replacing the Cold War bonds with those forged by integration. The deutsche mark (Germany's own currency) was the very symbol of German primacy. What better way to soften its edge than to multinationalize the country's currency? By way of the euro, Germany proposed to tie itself down. To the French, invaded thrice by Germany in the space of a lifetime, the euro offered perfect compensation…. Kohl's gracious offer of the deutsche mark as the foundation for a European currency was a godsend for France" ( A Century's Journey edited by Robert Pastor, p. 129, chapter "Germany" by Josef Joffe, editorial page editor and columnist of the Suddeutshe Zeitung , 1999).
"Never sever the tie to St. Petersburg"
Because of Bismarck's pivotal role in the defeat of France in the war of 1870-71, Germany under the kaisers never really had a hope of an alliance with France. But Bismarck, a former ambassador to Russia, always believed that Germany should "never sever the tie to St. Petersburg," the former capital of Russia. A close relationship, even an alliance, with Russia would secure Germany's eastern flank.
After Bismarck, Wilhelm II desperately tried to reach out to Russia, but failed when Russia and France became allies in 1893. This was to prove fatal in World War I when Germany had to fight on both flanks. Following the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Germans and Russians signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which effectively gave the Germans victory in the East. As a result of this treaty, Germany was free to mount a major offensive in the West.
Hitler's strategy was to defeat France first, then turn on Russia. What enabled him to do this was the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, between the Soviets and Germany. After defeating France, Hitler invaded Russia. After D-Day Germany ended up fighting on two flanks and lost.
Germany is again turning its attention to its eastern flank. The two countries are forging an economic deal that could shift the balance of power in Europe. The two ministers responsible for the economies of both countries met in December to debate details of a plan to exchange Russian debt for German equity in Russian companies. This would be a roundabout way for German banks to get back some of the money they have lent to Russia, which Moscow has not been able to repay.
Stratfor, an Internet news service, carried an article December 20, 2000, that stated, "Such a development would significantly weaken U.S. influence in Europe while dramatically strengthening Germany and Russia and helping them to advance to the front stage of world geopolitics." If successful, the deal "may help Russia's revival and Germany could emerge as the leader of a united Europe with Russia on its side."
The article, titled "Shifting Europe's Power Balance," added that "Germany would be glad to see Russia's vast resources come to Germany and Europe rather than to the east…. Berlin would also prefer these resources do not move overseas to the United States, Germany's current geopolitical rival" (emphasis added). Interestingly, Hitler thought that eventually "the struggle for global hegemony would come down to two contenders: Germany and the United States. The struggle was not just for Europe but, ultimately, for the whole world" ( A Century's Journey , pp. 109-110).
In the 1880s Bismarck remarked to a friend: "I will tell you the secret of politics: friendship with Ru ssia" (The Kaiser, by Virginia Cowles, p. 85). In a series of articles in the Hamburger Nacht richten in 1895 he emphasized "that Germany was only secure when she had a firm understanding with Russia" (ibid., p. 118).
During the first decade of the 20th century Kaiser Wilhelm II tried to build bridges between Germany, France and Russia. Prior to the Russian czar's visits to Paris and Berlin, he warned his uncle, the English King Edward VII, that these ties were intended to threaten British dominance. "'England could not fail to observe,' he said darkly, 'the strong movement among the countries of the continent towards an economic union to counter British influence, and she would do well to ponder over it'" (ibid., p. 196).
Realizing the threat that these developments posed to the English-speaking world, British Foreign Secretary Joseph Chamberlain wrote on September 10, 1900, "An alliance between Germany and Russia, entailing, as it would, the co-operation of France, is the one thing we have to dread…" (ibid., p. 187).
Shifting balance of power
It is a fact that a closer relationship between Berlin and Moscow would diminish Germany's dependence on the Western alliance. At the same time, closer European union, about to take a major leap forward in January 2002 when the euro replaces national currencies, will lessen Europe's need for America. Germany is and will remain the dominant force in the European Union. "Europe [is] a formalized deutsche mark zone in everything but name" ( A Century's Journey , p. 130).
Through the EU and closer ties to Russia, Germany ironically will have accomplished peacefully what the Second and Third Reichs failed to achieve-a united Europe built around Germany, providing limitless opportunities for German companies to expand, plentiful raw materials from undeveloped Russia and Siberia and trade access to former British and French colonies through the Lomé Convention that ties African, Caribbean and Pacific nations to the EU. Germany also will have secured both flanks, with strong economic ties east and west.
After Bismarck, Wilhelm II was obsessed with building up Germany to rival Great Britain, then the dominant global power. A century later British preeminence has been replaced by American hegemony. The new century will likely see a further change. The Bible tells us that God "removes kings and raises up kings" (Daniel 2:21). God also warns the modern descendants of ancient Israel, the American and British peoples, that He "will break the pride of [their] power" (Leviticus 26:19), a punishment for national sin. A time is coming when the United States will be replaced as the world's leading power, just as Britain lost her leadership role.
However, history would suggest that relations between Germany and Russia can suddenly turn sour. Bismarck's overtures to Russia were reversed when he was no longer chancellor and Wilhelm II took a closer interest in foreign policy. The kaiser tried to build closer ties with Russia but failed. Over 20 years later, Hitler's alliance with Stalin ended when the Soviet Union was attacked in June 1941. After World War II, Moscow's offer of a reunited but neutral Germany in the 1950s was rejected due to lack of trust. The Federal Republic felt more secure tied to the United States through the NATO alliance.
Bible prophecy also suggests that Russia and Germany will not be in alliance as end-time events unfold. Following an invasion of the "Glorious Land" (Holy Land) by the resurrected beast power (Daniel 11:40-43), "news from the east and the north shall trouble him" (verse 44), a likely reference to Russia in alliance with other military forces from the east. Revelation 9:16 prophesies of an "army of…two hundred million," suggesting an alliance of major powers to the east. Further, prophecies regarding Russia in Ezekiel chapters 38 and 39 do not show any alliance with the beast power.
Whatever the outcome of the financial deal between Moscow and Berlin, one fact is clear: Germany has become a major economic power, set to be America's "geopolitical rival" in the years ahead. WNP

Thursday, March 24, 2011

How Long Will the NATO Alliance Last?

From http://el-paso.ucg.org/  or call 1-888-886-8632.


How Long Will the NATO Alliance Last?


The 50th anniversary of the NATO alliance in 1999 was a celebration of the successful defense of the free world. Just 10 years later there are signs of serious trouble within the alliance.

by Paul Kieffer

One month before being officially nominated as the Democratic Party candidate for president in 2008, then Senator Barack Obama visited Berlin, Germany, and gave a speech to a crowd of some 200,000 Germans at the Victory Column, located 1 mile west of the Brandenburg Gate.



At the time, some opinion polls indicated that a number of Germans would rather have Obama as their own chancellor instead of Angela Merkel.



Obama's speech in Berlin on July 24, 2008, was well received by the enthusiastic crowd. However, the next day some commentators wondered whether people had really understood the implications of what Obama had said. He mentioned the threat of terrorism and emphasized that "no one nation, no matter how large or powerful, can defeat such challenges alone," and he praised "Europe's role in our [America's] security and our future."



The portion of the speech that really got news analysts' attention was Obama's reference to Afghanistan: "In this new century, Americans and Europeans alike will be required to do more—not less. Partnership and cooperation among nations is not a choice; it is the one way, the only way, to protect our common security...



"The Afghan people need our troops and your troops; our support and your support to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda, to develop their economy, and to help them rebuild their nation."



With his speech in Berlin, Obama had served notice that as president he would expect Germans—and America's other NATO partners—to contribute their fair share of the resources needed for NATO's mission in Afghanistan.



An increasingly unpopular war

America's NATO allies in Europe are confronted by the challenge of meeting their obligations to the alliance's mission in Afghanistan in the face of growing public discontent over the war.



Germany is no exception. According to public opinion polls, two thirds of the German people doubt that a military victory can be achieved in Afghanistan. The same percentage of Germans oppose a continuation of their country's military presence in Afghanistan.



When German troops were first sent to Afghanistan, the German government insisted that they be stationed in northern Afghanistan instead of the southern part of the country. Officials emphasized repeatedly that Germany's NATO troops were limited to the official NATO mission in Afghanistan, described as assisting "the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance" (quote from the NATO Web site).



By contrast, American troops in southern Afghanistan were also fighting terrorism by going after the Taliban.



In their early deployment to northern Afghanistan, German troops experienced only occasional direct resistance by Taliban fighters. In recent months, however, the number of German casualties has increased as the Taliban have begun to target German patrols. It seems as if the Taliban are now engaging America's NATO allies, like the Germans, in an attempt to influence public opinion back home.



If so, their tactic is working. Public outrage in Germany was intense during the first week of September after a German NATO commander called for American air support to recapture two hijacked fuel trucks.



The air strike reportedly killed as many as 70 civilians and prompted Afghan President Hamid Karzai to issue harsh criticism of the German commander: "What an error of judgment! More than 90 dead all because of a simple lorry that was, moreover, immobilised in a riverbed. Why didn't they send in ground troops to recover the fuel tank?" ("Rift Widens Between US and Germany Over Botched Afghanistan Air Strike," The Guardian, Sept. 7, 2009).



Aside from the backlash from incidents like this one, German participation in NATO missions outside the geographic boundaries of NATO member countries is a continual domestic challenge. Each military deployment requires the approval of the German parliament, the Bundestag, and approval has to be renewed at regular intervals.



Despite growing public opposition to the war in Afghanistan, it has not yet become a major political issue, largely because Germany's membership in the NATO alliance is supported by all major parties. However, an increase in German casualties will no doubt lead to greater public clamor for an end to Germany's involvement in Afghanistan. As the Vietnam War proved, public opinion can be a key factor in deciding whether to continue or curtail military deployment.



Other European countries involved in Afghanistan are also facing domestic pressure to withdraw. Just days after the botched air strike on the fuel trucks, Britain, France and Germany proposed a conference to discuss how the Afghan government could take on greater responsibility for its own security, thereby lessening the need for NATO troops in the country.



Who's the bad guy now?

When the NATO alliance was formed 60 years ago by the United States, Canada and European nations, it was clearly defensive in nature. NATO countries were obligated to support any member nation attacked by an aggressor. The potential aggressor was clearly the Soviet Union, and the alliance's purpose was to prevent westward expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe.



Of course, during the Cold War there was occasional friction among NATO members or between the United States and European NATO countries. However, the overriding goal of preserving Western Europe's freedom and economic system provided a common interest strong enough to override temporary differences of opinion.



The demise of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact alliance has changed all that. Europe is no longer threatened by an ideological "continental divide." Former Warsaw Pact countries have now joined the NATO alliance (and the European Union).



The defensive nature of the NATO alliance still exists on paper but not in practical application. Instead, the alliance has also assumed responsibility beyond its own borders in fulfilling United Nations peacekeeping missions.



Events of the last 10 years have shown that America and Europe—and even European nations among themselves—are not always unified in their assessment of strategic threats.



A prime example is former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's characterization of the "old" and "new" Europe during the crisis over Iraq and the Iraq war. Aside from some exceptions—most notably Britain—Western European nations ("old" Europe) were reluctant to support U.S. President George Bush's "coalition of the willing," in contrast to Eastern European nations ("new" Europe).



More recently, European NATO members disagree over how to deal with Russia. Dependent on natural gas deliveries from Russia, NATO members in Western Europe generally support a cautious, conciliatory approach. By contrast, Eastern European NATO members prefer a more confrontational style.



It was no surprise when Eastern European NATO members supported the Bush plan to install a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. In the summer of 2008 the United States signed a treaty with each country for the installation of a radar system in the Czech Republic and 10 missile silos in Poland.



President Obama's decision in September to stop the implementation of the project upset Eastern European allies. Their disappointment was best expressed by former Polish President Lech Walesa in a television interview: "The Americans are always concerned only about their own interests and just take advantage of everyone else."



Walesa urged Poland to reassess its relationship with the United States. Analysts now expect Eastern Europeans to see the need for better cooperation with Brussels on security issues. President Obama may have contributed to "new" and "old" Europe becoming more closely aligned.



Who pays the bill?

During the 1999 NATO bombing campaign to force Serbian troops out of Kosovo, then German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder voiced disappointment over America's reluctance to share spy satellite intelligence with its European allies. In his frustration Schroeder suggested that Europe should have its own spy satellites. He admitted, though, that America could do as it pleased since it was supplying over 90 percent of the equipment used for the Kosovo military intervention.



America's call for more equitable burden-sharing within the NATO alliance did not begin with Senator Obama's July 2008 speech in Berlin. With the Soviet threat gone, the unfulfilled desire to have Europe pay a larger share of its defense bill seems more futile now than at any time during the last 60 years when Europe enjoyed protection via America's nuclear shield.



Defense spending levels of NATO's main European members have declined in recent years, with a corresponding weakening of military capabilities. Germany, for example, today has 40 percent fewer soldiers and 50 percent fewer combat aircraft than it did at the end of the Cold War 20 years ago. Similar developments have taken place in key NATO nations like Spain and Italy.



The decay of European NATO military forces has reached the point that U.S. military officials are concerned that joint operations are becoming difficult and may well become impossible if the trend is not reversed.



Like the Kosovo intervention, the war in Afghanistan reflects unequal burden sharing, irritating even some European officials. In a speech last January, British Defense Secretary John Hutton had harsh criticism for European governments that fail to bear their fair share of the burden.



"Freeloading on the back of U.S. security is not an option if we wish to be equal partners in the transatlantic alliance," he warned in language less diplomatic than Obama's Berlin speech. "Anyone who wants to benefit from collective security must be prepared to share the ultimate price."



Hutton also appeared to question Germany's approach and that of other allies who believe that humanitarian and nation-building tasks are a fair substitute for combat duty. "It isn't good enough to always look to the U.S. for political, financial, and military cover. And this imbalance will not be addressed by parceling up NATO tasks—the 'hard' military ones for the U.S. and a few others (including Britain) and the 'soft' diplomatic ones for the majority of Europeans."



European NATO members would respond by saying that NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan is nation-building, not combat in support of Washington's "war on terror."



The beginning of the end?

American military commanders believe that the coming months will be crucial for the ultimate success or failure of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, which for them means a military victory over the resurgent Taliban. Likewise, the NATO mission in Afghanistan itself may well decide the future of the alliance itself.



If NATO cracks over Afghanistan, a short-sighted view would be that Europeans got tired of being pressured to do more fighting in America's war far from Europe and that America got tired of paying the lion's share of NATO's bills for European freeloaders. However, America did put up with the unequal burden-sharing within NATO during the Cold War because it was in America's own strategic interest to do so.



A realistic assessment would be that NATO is no longer a serious alliance with an overriding common strategic purpose as it was throughout the Cold War. Defending Western Europe against Soviet expansion served America's strategic purpose, and supporting America's efforts to do so was obviously in Europe's own best interests.



In the absence of a sustained response to an ongoing, common, immediate threat, NATO has become an alliance without a real purpose. Europe's strategic interests are no longer as closely aligned with those of the United States, as evidenced by the Iraq war, relations with Russia, and energy and environmental policies, to name just a few. History shows that the eventual demise of an alliance that has served its purpose can only be a question of time.



If Bible prophecy is our guide to understanding world events, the rift already evident within the NATO alliance can be viewed as a precursor to future events. Europe and the United States will eventually move in opposing strategic directions and become competitors instead of equal partners.



Out of Europe will arise a final resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire, whereas America's destiny—and her future relationship with Europe—will be determined by her unknown heritage linked to the biblical patriarch Abraham.



Want to know more? Order or download our free booklets The United States and Britain in Bible Prophecy and You Can Understand Bible Prophecy. They will provide you with valuable insights concerning the future of Europe and the United States. WNP